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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Grant argued that the Supreme Court denied him due 
process and equal protection when it denied him access to a transcript of a jurisdictional 
review hearing on appeal. Additionally, Mr. Grant argued that the district court erred 
when it denied defense counsel's motion to withdraw and admitted the victim's full 
impact statement. Mr. Grant also argued that the consecutive nature of his sentence is 
excessive and the district court abused its discretion when it denied his I.C.R. 35 
motion. 
In response, the State argued Mr. Grant was not denied due process and equal 
protection because the judge who presided over the jurisdictional review hearing was 
not the same judge who presided over the probation violation hearing and the I.C.R. 35 
hearing. (Respondent's brief, p.6.) The State also argued that Mr. Grant failed to 
preserve the issue of whether the district court erred in denying counsel's motion to 
withdraw (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12), that Mr. Grant has relied on an inapplicable 
death penalty case in support of his victim impact statement issue (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.18-23), and that the district court made appropriate sentencing determinations. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.23-30.) 
Mr. Grant is filing a Reply Brief to withdraw his due process and equal protection 
argument. Mr. Grant will also address the arguments presented in the State's 
Respondent's Brief. Additionally, this brief will clarify that Mr. Grant did not shoot 
Richard Lattimer in the face and chest. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Grant's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Grant due process and equal protection 
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the transcript of the jurisdictional 
review hearing?1 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to grant defense counsel's motion to 
withdraw? 
3. Did the district court error in err when it admitted the victim's impact statement? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Grant's sentence in 
the 2005 case to run consecutively with the sentences in the 2009 cases? 
5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Grant's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of Mr. Grant's 
continuing family support?2 
1 As stated above, this issue is being withdrawn from this Court's consideration. As the 
State accurately points out (Respondent's Brief, p.6), the judge presiding over the 
probation revocation hearing and the rule 35 hearing was not the same judge who 
presided over the jurisdictional review hearing, and therefore, Mr. Grant's claim that the 
judge could have relied on its memory of the jurisdictional review hearing is not 
supported by the record. (R., Vol. I, pp.126-127; R., Vol. II, pp.396-400, 405-406.) 




The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To 
Withdraw 
A. Introduction 
The State argues that Mr. Grant "waived" the district court's disposition of the 
motion to withdraw when he entered into an unconditional guilty plea. (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.11-12.) Contrary to the State's assertion, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
implicitly recognized in State v. Trefren 112 Idaho 812 (1987), that a guilty plea does not 
waive a claim that trial counsel had a conflict of interest.3 Moreover, a complete 
communication breakdown between Mr. Grant and his trial counsel undermines the 
guilty plea, in that it cannot be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if he could not 
communicate with his attorney before entered his plea. 
Additionally, the State cited State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450 (Ct. App. 1997), for the 
proposition that a district court need not provide the defendant a full and fair opportunity 
to present the facts pertaining to an alleged conflict when defense counsel files a motion 
for substitute counsel. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-16.) Mr. Grant argues that the State 
misstates the holding in Smith because that case was dealing with a public defender's 
3 Mr. Grant recognizes that in State v. Andersen, 2011 Unpublished Opinion NO.573 
(August 5, 2011) the Idaho Court of Appeals held, while discussing Trefren, that an 
unconditional guilty plea does waive a defendant's assertion that counsel was 
conflicted. Since this is an unpublished opinion and not binding authority, Mr. Grant 
argues, in reliance on Trefren, that an unconditional guilty does not "waive" the ability to 
raise the allegations of a conflict on appeal. See Supreme Court Operating Rule 15(f) 
"If an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as authority or precedent in any 
court."). 
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motion to withdraw based on his client's desire to hire private counsel and not a request 
for substitute court appointed counsel based on a conflict of interest. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To 
Withdraw 
1. Mr. Grant's Unconditional Guilty Plea Did Not "Waive" His Ability To 
Challenge The District Court's Disposition Of His Motion To Withdraw 
The State asserts that Mr. Grant's motion to withdraw as counsel was not 
preserved pursuant to a conditional plea agreement and, therefore, cannot be raised on 
appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.) While Mr. Grant agrees with the general 
proposition that a valid plea agreement waives many issues, the State cited to no 
authority specifically stating that a valid guilty plea will waive the right to counsel. 
Moreover, there is case authority, which implicitly contradicts the State's 
assertion. In Trerren, supra, Mr. Trefren's counsel filed a motion to withdraw, wherein 
revealed that he had recently been appointed as a prosecuting attorney and asserted 
his defense of Mr. Trefren constituted a conflict of interest. Id. at 813. Thereafter, 
Mr. Trefren entered a guilty plea; however, the opinion does not address whether it was 
a conditional or an unconditional plea. Id. at 813-814. On appeal, Mr. Trefren raised 
the conflict of interest issue and the Court of Appeals addressed the merits of 
Mr. Trefren's claim. Id. at 814. Therefore, the Idaho Court of Appeals has implicitly 
held that a guilty plea does not waive a claim that trial counsel had a conflict of interest. 
Additionally, in State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711 (Ct. App. 1997), Mr. Peck made 
various claims throughout the proceedings that he was dissatisfied with his public 
defenders. Id. at 712. In one of those instances, he filed a pro se motion requesting 
substitute counsel prior to the entry of plea hearing. Id. at 712. At the change of plea 
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hearing, Mr. Peck told the district court that he had worked out the problems he had with 
his public defender. Id. Thereafter, "[t]he court accepted the guilty plea and set a date 
for a sentencing hearing." Id. On appeal, Mr. Peck argued that the district court should 
have held a hearing and inquired into the reasons Mr. Peck was dissatisfied with his 
public defender. Id. at 713. The Idaho Court of Appeals ruled that Mr. Peck's claim 
regarding his request for substitute counsel was moot because Mr. Peck told the district 
court that he had resolved the problems he had with his public defender. Id. While the 
Idaho Court of Appeals was not specifically addressing the question of whether 
Mr. Peck's guilty plea functioned as a waiver of his motion requesting substitute 
counsel, the fact that the Court ruled on the merits of his motion on appeal functions as 
an implicit holding that he did not waive the issue. 
Additionally, this issue should not be waived upon the entry of an unconditional 
guilty plea, because a defendant's inability to communicate with his/her attorney 
undermines the validity of the plea. See State v. Manzanares, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 
29344 * 7(ldaho 2012) ("Ordinarily, a plea of guilty, if voluntarily and knowingly made, is 
conclusive as to the defendant's guilt and waives all non-jurisdictional defects in prior 
proceedings against the defendant."). The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that "[a]n accused's right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental 
component of our criminal justice system" and "[o]f all the rights that an accused person 
has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his 
ability to assert any other rights that he may have." United States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 
648, 653-654 (1984) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). As such, If Mr. Grant 
was going to waive his right to counsel that waiver must have been knowing, intelligent, 
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and voluntary. However, Mr. Grant was not expressly asked if he wanted to waive his 
right to counsel during the plea colloquy.4 Therefore, he did not waive the right to 
counsel. Moreover, if Mr. Grant could not communicate with his attorney, that 
undermines his right to counsel during the plea negotiations, which functions as an 
independent reason to question the validly of his guilty plea. 
In sum, there is case law which implicitly holds that the entry of an unconditional 
guilty plea does not function as a waiver of Mr. Grant's motion requesting substitute 
counsel. Additionally, Mr. Grant's guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
if he could not communicate with his attorney. 
2. The Holding Of Smith Is Not Applicable To The Facts Of This Case 
Because The District Court Interpreted Mr. Grant's Motion To Withdraw As 
A Request For Substitute Court Appointed Counsel 
The State argues that a different procedure may be employed in instances where 
defense counsel, as opposed to the defendant, files a motion requesting substitute court 
appointed counsel. (Respondent's Brief, p.14.) Specifically, the State argues that when 
defense counsel files the motion requesting substitute counsel, the district court does 
not have to afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present facts in support of 
the attorney's motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) 
In support of this argument, the State cites to Smith. (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-
16.) In Smith, the defendant wrote a letter to the district court. Id. at 452. The letter 
was provided to the defendant's public defender, who filed a motion to withdraw as 
counsel. Id. At the hearing held on the motion, defense counsel argued that he should 
4 The district court did ask Mr. Grant if he was satisfied with his attorney and 
Mr. Granted answered affirmatively. (Tr., p.136, L.19 - p.137, L.4.) 
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be allowed to withdraw because the defendant wanted to retain private counsel. Id. 
The defendant did not dispute the public defender's characterization of his position. Id. 
"In consideration of speedy trial limits raised by the prosecuting attorney, the district 
court denied counsel's motion to withdraw, requiring the public defender to remain as 
counsel of record until Smith made arrangements for new counsel to represent him at 
the trial as scheduled." Id. 
The defendant ultimely appealed and argued that "the district court erred in 
failing to appoint new counsel after Smith expressed dissatisfaction with the public 
defender assigned to his case." Id. The Court of Appeals cited to the following 
authority and employed the following analysis when affirming the district court: 
An indigent defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel, 
including the right to effective assistance of counsel. Absent extraordinary 
circumstances, the right to counsel does not include the right to appointed 
counsel of the defendant's choice. A trial judge may, in his discretion, 
appoint new counsel, on request, for "good cause." 
As in Clayton, supra,5 Smith has not claimed that the public 
defender was ineffective, but he argues that the district court should have 
conducted a more detailed inquiry into the source of the attorney-client 
conflict as set forth in Smith's letter to the district court. The district court 
did not interpret Smith's letter as a motion for substitution of new 
appointed counsel and. thus. did not engage in a "good cause" analysis. 
Furthermore, the district court's ruling did not foreclose Smith's opportunity 
to retain private counsel and to present a substitution of counsel. Having 
reviewed the explanation given by the public defender at the hearing on 
the motion to withdraw, and in light of the ambiguity of Smith's letter, we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. 
Id. at 452-453. (citations omitted) (underlined and bold emphasis added). Contrary to 
the State's assertion, Smith does not stand for the proposition that in instances when 
5 State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896 (1980). 
8 
defense counsel files the motion requesting substitute counsel, the district court does 
not have to afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present facts in support of 
the attorney's motion. (Respondent's Brief, pp.13-14.) The State's focus on the person 
that files the motion is misplaced, because, in Smith, the true issue was the fact that the 
defendant's letter and the attorney's motion was interpreted as a request for private 
counsel, not substitute court-appointed counsel. Accordingly, in Smith, the district court 
was not required to engage in the "good cause analysis" because it interpreted the 
motion as a request for private counsel. Moreover, the district court did not prevent the 
defendant from hiring private counsel. The district court merely had the public defender 
remain on the case until the defendant could hire private counsel. The district court did 
this because it did not want to delay the case in light of the prosecutor's comment about 
the defendant's speedy trial rights. In this case, there are no facts which indicate that 
Mr. Grant wanted to hire private counsel. (R., Vol. II, pp.230.) The issue was whether 
the district court would appoint a new public defender (R., Vol. II, pp.230), and 
therefore, the district court was required to engage in an adequate inquiry into the 
nature of the alleged conflict between Mr. Grant and his trial counsel. 
In sum, the State relies on mere factual coincidences between this case and 
Smith, and then argues that Smith is controlling. However, the State ignores the fact 
that Smith was dealing with a request for private counsel and a request for new court 
appointed counsel. As such, the State's reliance on Smith is misplaced and its holding 
is not applicable to Mr. Grant's request for new court appointed counsel. 
9 
III. 
The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's Impact Statement 
A. Introduction 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Grant relied on, State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 
(2008), a death penalty case, when he argued that the district court erred when it 
allowed a victim impact statement which included characterizations of the crime, the 
defendant, and the appropriate sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.26-33.) The State 
responded by arguing that the decision to impose the death penalty is a jury issue, while 
in non-capitol cases sentencing is performed by a judge. (Respondent's Brief, pp.18-
23.) Therefore, the States argues the restrictions in victim impact statements in death 
penalty cases are imposed so the jury does not arbitrarily impose the death penalty and 
that risk is not present when a judge imposes a sentence in a non-capitol case. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.18-23.) However, the State's reliance on the distinction 
between sentences imposed by a jury versus a judge has no bearing on the standards 
set forth in Payne, because the sentence in that case was imposed by a judge. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's Impact Statement 
The State's primary argument in response to Mr. Grant's request to extend the 
holding of Payne to non-death penalty cases is based on the fact that juries make the 
decision to impose death, while judges impose sentence in non-death penalty cases. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.26-33.) The State's distinction is meaningless because Darrell 
Payne was sentenced to death by a judge. 
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In Payne, "[t]he district court proceeded to sentence Payne pursuant to Idaho's 
former death penalty statute, I.C. § 19-2515 (2001 )." Payne, 146 Idaho at 557. After a 
three day sentencing hearing, the district court, not a jury, sentenced Mr. Payne to 
death. Id. 
The fact that a judge decided to impose the death penalty is important because it 
undermines the State's argument that the limitations for victim impact statements 
contained in Payne should not be applied to non-capitol cases because Idaho judges 
will be able to ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the information before them at 
sentencing. (Respondent's Brief, p.21.) However, the Payne decision functions as a 
limit to that presumption, in the specific context of a victim impact statements. 
In sum, the State's purported distinction between capitol and non-capitol cases is 
specious because a judge imposed the death penalty in Payne. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior Sentence In 
The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The 2009 Cases 
A. Introduction 
In the 2005 aggravated battery case, Mr. Granted admitted that he fired one 
bullet into the ground and that bullet happened to ricochet and hit the victim in the leg. 
In the Respondent's Brief, the State asserts that Mr. Grant shot the victim multiple 
times, and hit the victim in the face and chest, requiring over 500 stitches. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1, 25.) This assertion is not supported by the record and is 
contradicted by the district court's factual findings. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior 
Sentence In The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The 
2009 Cases 
The State described the 2005 offense as follows: 
[Mr. Grant] was first convicted of aggravated battery in 2006. (R., vol. I 
pp.122-24.) He explained that he was involved in a large fight and 
described what occurred: someone ran "over to them with a metal pipe 
and starts swinging [sic] it so I run [sic] over toward them and get rushed 
by like 4 or 5 guys than I pulled the gun out and pointed it to the ground 
and pulled the trigger, everyone stopped fightin [sic] and started running 
... " (2006 PSI, p.4.) The bullets ricocheted and hit the victim in the head 
in the chest, requiring over 500 stitches. (PSI, p.5.) [Mr. Grant] admitted 
that he was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the shooting.6 
(Respondent's Brief, p.25 (emphasis added)). 
The State's version of events confuses Richard Lattimer who sustained head 
injuries from a metal pipe and a wooden bat with the injuries Tyler Solomon sustained 
from the gun wound. In the PSI, Richard Lattimer stated that he walked outside of his 
home and "Mr. Nichols" had a wooden bat and Billy G. had a black colored pipe. (PSI, 
p.2.) Richard Lattmier said that Mr. Nichols, the man with the wooden bat, hit him in the 
head. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Lattimer, then turned around and Mr. Nichols "hit him again in the 
front left side if his head." (PSI, p.2.) 
A different witness, Ricky Lattimer,? stated that Richard Lattimer was struck in 
the head with a bat. (PSI, p.3.) Ricky Lattimer stated the same guy struck Richard two 
6 While the State implicitly addresses Mr. Grant's consumption of alcohol as an 
aggravating factor, this can be considered as a mitigating factor, because his alcohol 
consumption could have inhibited his ability to fully comprehend the dangerous nature 
of his actions, which in turn reduced his culpability. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 
414 (1981). This mitigating factor is consistent with the district court's characterization 
of Mr. Grant's offense as being a stupid way to stop the fight. (Tr., p.69. L.6 - p.lO, 
L.12 
? Ricky Lattimer appears to be Richard Lattimer's brother. (PSI, pp.2-4.) 
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more times. (PSI, p.3.) Ricky Lattimer said he heard a gunshot then saw a guy strike 
Richard Lattimer in the head with a black pipe. (PSI, p.3.) Richard Lattimer received 
over 500 stitches for the laceration to his head. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Grant's victim was Tyler Solomon, not Richard Lattimer. (PSI, p.4.) In the 
defendant's version of the events, Mr. Grant states that "T J Soloman did not deserve 
what I did to him." (PSI, p.4.) One of the police reports included in the clerk's record 
stated that "Richard Lattimer had been struck in the head with an aluminum baseball 
bat8 and that T J Solomon had been shot with a ... handgun." (R. Vol. I., p.22.) 
Another police report stated that "the bullet entered the back of [Mr. Solomon's] left 
thigh and exited the inside of his left thigh. The bullet then entered the interior portion of 
his right thigh, and the bullet lodged just under the skin in the outside of his right thigh." 
(R., Vol. I, p.43.) The inference which can be drawn from the foregoing is that 
Mr. Solomon was hit by one bullet which injured his leg. 
The district court's factual findings also support Mr. Grant's version of events. At 
the change of plea hearing, Mr. Grant admitted to firing one bullet into the ground that 
ricocheted and hit the victim in the leg. (Tr., p.40, Ls.2-18.) At the sentencing hearing, 
and after reviewing the 2006 PSI, the district court made the following factual findings: 
I'm considering the nature of your offense, in other words, what you 
did. Now ... I'm not minimizing what you did here, Mr. Grant, but it's not 
like you just started firing into a crowd and dropping bodies all over the 
place. 
You shot - - totally stupid - - you shot at the ground. I mean - - and, 
you know, predictably, the ricochet hit this fellow. It could have hit more 
than one. To your benefit, you didn't shoot anymore and the crowd 
8 While the aluminum baseball bat is not consistent with the wooden bat and the metal 
pipe, it is consistent with the other witness that said Richard Lattimer was hit in the head 
with a bat shaped weapon. 
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dispersed ... when they saw somebody shooting a gun, everybody took 
off. 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you have been forthright and honest with the Court, 
admitting what you did. 
The prosecutor is certainly right, this is a serious crime, and in looking at 
the facts here, again, you didn't start blasting away at the crowd or that 
one particular person, you shot at the ground, and I think is an attempt - -
stupidly - - to stop what was going on. 
(Tr., p.69. L.6 - p.70, L.12 (emphasis added)). According to the district court, Mr. Grant 
shot at the ground and "didn't shoot anymore." From this statement is can be inferred 
that the district court concluded that Mr. Grant fired one shot. Moreover, the district 
court characterized Mr. Grant's decision to fire the shot as an attempt to stop the fight, 
and not attempt to shoot a person. The district court also stated that it believed 
Mr. Grant's admission that he fired one gun shot into the ground which ricocheted and 
hit the victim in the leg. 
The State's assertion that Mr. Grant fired multiple shots into the ground, which hit 
the victim in the head and chest, is based on a complete misunderstanding of the basic 
facts, and confuses Richard Lattimer's injuries with Mr. Solomon's injuries. 
Further, the district court found that Mr. Grant was a peacemaker and intended stop the 
fight when he fired the gun and that decision caused the crowd to disperse. So, while 
accidentally injuring Mr. Solomon, he might have actually prevented Mr. Lattimer from 
sustaining any further harm. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Grant respectfully requests that this Court either remand this action to hold 
further proceedings regarding the inquiry into the breakdown in attorney client 
relationship or vacate his conviction and sentence and restore his trial rights. In the 
event this Court determines that the district court erred in admitting the victim impact 
statement, Mr. Grant requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand this 
matter to the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Grant requests that this Court order his 
sentences in the 2009 cases to run concurrently with his sentence in the 2006 case. 
DATED this 1ih day of April, 2012. 
~ .. ~l/'---
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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